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inTRoducTion
Despite being considered the traditional and prototypical philosophical method, 
 conceptual analysis is an approach to philosophical inquiry with a checkered past and a 
tarnished reputation. This is particularly true in metaethics, which we understand here 
as concerned not only with ethics or morality proper but also with the normative more 
generally. In recent decades, metaethicists have often consigned conceptual analysis to 
the trash pile of philosophical mistakes, yet it has always had adherents and today enjoys 
a renaissance. In this selective and opinionated chapter, we explore various dimensions 
of the debate, framed around two foundational questions: (1) what is it to use and possess 
a normative concept? and (2) what is it to analyze a normative concept? We attempt to 
avoid broader questions about the nature and analysis of concepts in general (for orienta-
tion, see Margolis & Laurence, 1999, 2015).
Analysis we understand, most broadly, as investigation into or explication of something’s 
nature. All we assume at the outset about the nature of concepts is (1) that they are psycho-
logical resources employed in and enabling us to have thoughts, and (2) that they are psycho-
logical types of some kind rather than tokens—whether of mental representations, contents, 
abilities, processes, or similar—and therefore that different people can share the same con-
cept. We make no assumptions about what makes a concept normative, except that normative 
concepts are those whose involvement in a thought make that thought normative—as it is the 
involvement of the concept wrong that makes the thought that killing is wrong normative, 
rather than the concept killing. The extension of the class of normative concepts is contro-
versial—contested cases include cruel, true, and meaning—but our treatment focuses on 
less controversially normative concepts such as wrong, good, ought, and reason.
The conceptual domain is helpfully juxtaposed against the linguistic and metaphysi-
cal domains, which it is commonly viewed as mediating. First, consider the relationship 
between the conceptual and the linguistic. A common assumption is that many (so-called 
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lexical) concepts can be identified as the conventional meanings of words, a connection 
we’ll call the word-concept nexus. Conceptual analysis is therefore often equated with, 
and pursued by means of, semantic analysis or study of linguistic meaning. This article 
focuses on such lexical concepts, following the convention of denoting them with cor-
responding words in small caps; for example, ‘wrong’ refers to the conceptual meaning 
of the English word ‘wrong’. For convenience, we will typically speak as if words and con-
cepts stand in a one-to-one relationship, although readers should be wary of this assump-
tion. On one hand, wrong is potentially also the meaning of the German word ‘unrecht’ 
and the Swahili word ‘vibaya’, for example; on the other hand, some normative words 
may be ambiguous or context-sensitive in meaning, so it may be necessary to distinguish 
between wrong1, wrong2, and so on. 
Second, consider the relationship between the conceptual and metaphysical domains. 
The latter potentially includes normative entities such as reasons and obligations, norma-
tive properties such as wrongness and goodness, normative relations such as counting- 
in-favor-of, and normative states of affairs such as that lying is sometimes wrong. 
Philosophical discussion often takes for granted that the basic function of concepts is to 
“pick out” entities or properties in the world, enabling us to talk and think about them; 
we’ll call this connection the concept-world nexus. On this basis, conceptual analysis is 
traditionally thought to provide a path to understanding not only normative concepts 
and thoughts but also the nature of normative properties and facts. This hoped-for meta-
physical payoff is a central motivation of conceptual analysis in metaethics, but, as we will 
show, normative concepts can also be of interest for their own sake.
The classical TheoRy, PRiMiTivisM, and The oPen 
quesTion aRguMenT
Philosophical tradition presents the Classical Theory of the nature of concepts and con-
ceptual analysis, which traces its (Western) roots back at least to a foundational metaethi-
cal text, Plato’s Euthyphro. Our discussion is organized around this view (following the 
model of Margolis & Laurence, 1999): after sketching its central tenets, in subsequent 
sections we introduce more recent, alternative views on normative concepts in terms of 
their departures from the Classical Theory.
The Classical Theory involves at least the following core tenets:
1. Cognitivism: Concepts have an essentially referential or representational function (or 
“role”) of picking out items at the metaphysical level. For example, the concept wrong 
enables us to ascribe and think about the property of wrongness, and the concept 
obligation enables us to ascribe and think about obligations, as normative entities. 
2. Definitionism: Concepts fulfill this referential function by providing necessary and 
sufficient conditions for something’s falling within the concept’s extension—a set of 
conditions that may be articulated in the form of a descriptive definition. For exam-
ple, Socrates’ stalking horse in the Euthyphro is the proposed definition of pious as 
what is approved by the Gods.
3. Compositionality: Concepts can be either complex (structured) or simple (primi-
tive, atomic). Complex concepts are composed out of simpler conceptual parts. For 
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 example, on Euthyphro’s view, the concept pious is composed at least of the simpler 
concepts approved and gods. 
4. Reductivism: To analyze a concept is to decompose it, revealing its constituent parts 
and how they are interrelated—particularly, by providing its descriptive definition.
5. Analyticity: Some thoughts and sentences (termed “analytic”) are guaranteed true 
simply because of the concepts or meanings of the terms involved. On Euthyphro’s 
view, for example, it is analytic that if the gods approve of prosecuting one’s father for 
murder then it is pious to prosecute one’s father for murder.
6. Essentialism: The internal structure of a concept mirrors the internal metaphysical 
structure of the normative property (entity, etc.) that it picks out. A corollary: by 
reductive analysis of a concept, we can also derive a reductive metaphysical analysis 
of the corresponding property.
Additionally, the Classical Theory accepts the following tenets about the epistemology of 
concepts:
7. Competency as Grasping a Definition: Possession of a concept consists in (some kind 
of) psychological grasp of its descriptive definition; competence with a word consists 
in associating it with its definition.
8. Transparency: Being mental entities, concepts are transparent to reflection. They 
therefore can be analyzed, and any analytic truths identified, from the armchair in 
exercises of purely a priori or nonempirical inquiry (i.e. by “intuition”).
The application of this classical package to normative concepts is exemplified in the early 
twentieth century in the work of G.E. Moore (1903). However, Moore also sent an early 
shot across the bow of the ambitions of conceptual analysis in metaethics, independent of 
any of the objections later raised against the Classical Theory, with a challenge that largely 
set the stage for subsequent debate.
By the classical tenet of compositionality, all concepts are ultimately made up out of 
simple or primitive conceptual elements. This raises the possibility that some normative 
concepts are among these simple elements. By the tenet of reductivism, such simple nor-
mative concepts would be unanalyzable, since they do not admit of further decomposi-
tion or definition. By the tenet of essentialism, this possibility further implies that some 
normative properties or entities are similarly simple and unanalyzable. This combination 
of views, which we’ll call primitivism, is embraced by Moore and many contemporary 
metaethicists. (It is often labeled “nonnaturalism,” but we’ll stay neutral about the correct 
use of this terminology.) Primitivists disagree over which normative concept or concepts 
to identify as basic. We’ll follow Moore in privileging good, although today reason or 
counts-in-favor-of are more commonly preferred (e.g. Scanlon, 1998).
Primitivism might seem a relatively minor challenge to the ambitions of conceptual 
analysis. On Moore’s view, for example, every other normative concept is complex and 
thus analyzable, including right as produces most good. Even as the Classical Theory 
has fallen into general disrepute, few metaethicists have denied that there are at least 
some illuminating analyses of normative concepts along classical lines, such as the pop-
ular reductive analysis of murder as (at least partly) wrongful killing. But a guid-
ing aim of metaethical inquiry has been to explicate the puzzling nature of  normativity 
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per se, and hence of normative concepts as a class. Therefore, metaethicists have typically 
been interested primarily in the possibility of (conceptual and metaphysical) analysis 
of the normative at the global level rather than of any individual normative concept 
or property. Most metaethical discussion of conceptual analysis is therefore directed 
at the prospects for analyzing all or any normative concepts into complexes of entirely 
nonnormative elements, a Holy Grail widely equated with “analytic reduction” of the 
normative as such.
Why believe any normative concepts are simple and unanalyzable? The primary moti-
vation is Moore’s famous and still influential Open Question Argument (OQA), which 
relies heavily on the tenets of the Classical Theory. For our purposes, this argument can 
be presented as follows:
OQ1.  For any description D and concept M, if D is a correct definition or analysis of M, 
then it must be a closed question (roughly, one with a self-evidently positive an-
swer) for competent users of M that whatever is D is also M, and vice versa.
OQ2.  There exists no description D such that it is a closed question for competent users 
of the concept good that whatever is D is also good, or vice versa.
OQ3.  Therefore, there exists no description D that is a correct definition or analysis of 
the concept good.
OQ4.  (Conceptual Conclusion) Therefore, good is a simple and unanalyzable concept. 
OQ5.  (Metaphysical Conclusion) Therefore, goodness is a simple and unanalyzable 
 property. 
Many metaethicists view Moore’s ultimate, metaphysical conclusion as unacceptable and 
therefore reject one or another of the argument’s steps or assumptions—which usually 
involves the rejection of one or more classical tenets. Subsequent sections investigate the 
major responses in roughly reverse order of how radically they depart from the Classical 
Theory. We will suggest that more extreme rejections of the Classical Theory may be 
overreactions and that a subtler departure may be a better course. However, we first con-
clude this section by observing some problems for the primitivist’s (typically classical) 
treatment of normative concepts. (We largely ignore primitivist treatments of normative 
properties, as they fall outside our scope.)
One thorny issue for primitivism derives from a puzzle for the Classical Theory about 
simple concepts, its basic building blocks. Notice that the tenet of definitionism (Classical 
Theory’s official story of how concepts refer to properties in the world) as well as the tenet 
of competency as grasping a definition (the official story of what it is to possess a concept) 
cannot extend to simple concepts, which as such lack descriptive definitions. Primitivism 
therefore owes some other account of how simple normative concepts pick out norma-
tive properties and of what possession of them consists in. This challenge might not seem 
especially difficult, since it is a well-established view in general philosophy of mind that 
some—perhaps even all—concepts are primitive (e.g. Jerry Fodor’s conceptual atomism; 
for discussion, see Margolis & Laurence, 1999: 59–71). However, metaethical primitivists 
face a special problem because conceptual atomists generally explain the concept-world 
nexus by appeal to causal connections between the properties in the world and the con-
cepts in our minds. This answer is not available to most metaethical primitivists, who 
hold that basic normative properties are not causally efficacious.
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A related difficulty concerns how simple normative concepts are acquired if  normative 
properties never causally interact with us or our senses in any way. Here, primitivists 
might seem obliged to embrace nativism, the Platonic idea that normative concepts are 
innate. This in turn raises difficult questions about how we could ever be justified in 
believing that our normative concepts successfully pick out anything that actually exists 
or that our normative thoughts ever correspond to reality. Metaethicists who have flirted 
with nativism have indeed tended to be error theorists, denying that normative con-
cepts and thoughts ever correspond to anything actually existing in the world (e.g. Joyce, 
2006). In our opinion, primitivists owe these problems of concept reference, possession, 
and acquisition greater attention than they have received.
Primitivists generally maintain that basic normative truths are a priori and knowable 
from the armchair by intuition alone—as is widely accepted. This forces an awkward 
choice. The a priori status and intuitionistic methodology of ethics seem easily explained 
(by the classical tenet of transparency) if these propositions are analytic and therefore 
knowable through conceptual analysis—but this explanation seems (prima facie) una-
vailable to primitivism and would apparently falsify OQ2, which denies the existence of 
any closed questions linking good with a description D in nonnormative terms. The sec-
ond option is to maintain that the propositions are nonanalytic—or synthetic—in which 
case their a priori status is widely perceived to be mysterious.
Traditionally, primitivists take this second path, embracing (e.g. Enoch, 2011) or 
denying (e.g. Scanlon, 2014) the mystery. As is seldom noticed, this choice also stands in 
a potentially embarrassing tension with the OQA. This is because the notion of a “closed 
question” is perilously close to that of an a priori truth (see further discussion below). 
Premise OQ2 may therefore prove incompatible with the intuitionist claim that first-order 
normative propositions are knowable a priori (Soames, 2011). Recently, some primitiv-
ists have reached for the first option above, conceding that a priori normative proposi-
tions are indeed conceptual truths. They maintain their rejection of analytic reductions of 
normative concepts by allowing only conditionals and never biconditionals: for example, 
an action is wrong if it is an intentional infliction of suffering on the innocent for fun, but 
not only if (Audi, 2004; Huemer, 2005; Cuneo & Shafer-Landau, 2014). We worry that 
this strategy may succeed only in moving the bump in the rug. To avoid the result that 
normative concepts can be reductively analyzed after all, as massive disjunctions of such 
conditionals, it seems committed to some further (basic) normative element in a concept 
like wrong or good, and the possibility of knowing (nonanalytic) truths involving this 
further element remains unaccounted for.
naTuRalisM, synTheTic definiTions, and seManTic exTeRnalisM
These problems seem easily avoided if we reject primitivism in favor of a metaethical 
naturalism that identifies or reduces normative properties to causally efficacious, “natu-
ral” properties. This option is supposed to be ruled out by the OQA’s final inference, from 
its conceptual to its metaphysical conclusion. However, the inference is fallacious: basic 
normative properties could be complex and analyzable, contra primitivism, even if nor-
mative concepts aren’t. This amounts to rejecting at least the classical tenet of essentialism, 
which looks vulnerable: plausibly, not every concept picks out its object by that object’s 
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essence or basic composition. On most theories, the same objects or properties can be 
picked out by different concepts; famously, the planet Venus can be picked out by either 
the concept morning star or the concept evening star. So the correct reductive or 
essential definitions of normative properties like goodness could be synthetic rather than 
analytic, like the definition of water as H2O (e.g. Railton, 1986; Copp, 2007). In that case, 
their discovery wouldn’t be possible through a priori conceptual analysis alone and might 
require empirical investigation. Rejection of essentialism and appeal to synthetic defini-
tions doesn’t dispose of all the puzzles about normative concepts, however. For example, it 
doesn’t by itself explain why it would be so difficult to find any analytic truths connecting 
normative and nonnormative terms. Helen and Richard Yetter-Chappell (2013) argue that 
synthetic naturalists might take inspiration from strategies deployed in the philosophy of 
mind to explain away “explanatory gaps” left by physicalist definitions of consciousness.
A particularly radical departure from the Classical Theory is found in “Cornell 
Realism” (e.g. Brink, 1984; Boyd, 1988), which seeks at once to evade the OQA’s challenge 
and put metaphysical analysis of normative properties on a respectably naturalistic foot-
ing by freeing it from conceptual analysis altogether. This combines synthetic naturalism 
with the doctrine of semantic externalism, which rejects the classical tenet of competency 
as grasping a definition (or “description theory”). The 1970s saw the introduction and 
embrace of the view that making reference to something in speech or thought requires 
only acquisition of a term linked to the referent by an appropriate causal chain—even 
if one lacks any individuating description. This can be seen as denying a necessary role 
for concepts in language and thought altogether (in Hilary Putnam’s slogan, “Meaning 
ain’t in the head”) and replacing the word-concept nexus and concept-world nexus with 
a direct word-world nexus. The strongest version of such naturalism repudiates not only 
the highest ambitions but also the very possibility of armchair conceptual analysis, and its 
dominance over philosophical thought in the 1980s contributed greatly to the disrepute 
of this methodology.
Over recent years, however, the popularity of this kind of naturalism in metaethics 
seems to have faded. Observing that normative thought and language could conceiv-
ably function this way is one thing; demonstrating they actually function this way is 
quite another, and the case for synthetic definitions of and causal reference to normative 
properties seems weak. Not every class of words is as amenable to this treatment as the 
paradigmatic examples of names (‘Aristotle’) and natural kind terms (‘water’, ‘tiger’)—
consider mathematical vocabulary, for example—and it seems a particularly poor fit for 
normative vocabulary (see Pigden, 2012). A primary problem is the already mentioned 
intuitionist or a priori epistemology of a robust range of normative truths, which is a 
primary motivation for primitivists’ denials that normative properties could be “natu-
ralistic.” Commonly cited examples include both basic first-order normative proposi-
tions such as that intentionally inflicting suffering on the innocent for fun is wrong, and 
propositions about the nature of normative properties such as that they supervene on 
the nonnormative state of the world. This suggests that basic competence with norma-
tive thought involves substantial acquaintance with the essences of normative properties. 
While many philosophers have followed Immanuel Kant in embracing the possibility of 
synthetic a priori knowledge, particularly in ethics, this doesn’t seem a genuine option 
for Cornell Realists, since it is implausible that causally efficacious or natural facts and 
properties are the kinds of things into which we could have a priori insight.
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noncogniTivisM, aTTiTudes, and infeRences
An entirely different and perennially popular way of reacting to the OQA involves 
 rejecting the inference from OQ3 (there is no description that is a correct definition 
of a basic normative concept) to the conceptual conclusion OQ4 (basic normative con-
cepts are simple and unanalyzable) by way of rejecting the core classical tenet of cognitiv-
ism, that normative concepts have the essentially referential or representational role in 
thought of picking out normative properties. This noncognitivist approach has the virtue 
of easily avoiding all the problems observed above for primitivism and synthetic natural-
ism, as explained below. Hybrid approaches postulating a combination of cognitive and 
noncognitive functions are also popular today, although more often formulated at the 
linguistic than the conceptual level; these have their own strengths and weaknesses (see 
Teemu Toppinen’s chapter “Hybrid Accounts of Ethical Thought and Talk” ).
General philosophical discussions of concepts often assume that the essential role of 
concepts is to pick out or refer to things in the metaphysical domain, such as individual 
entities (Aristotle), kinds (bachelor, horse), and properties (yellow). However, if taking 
our cues to the range in the conceptual domain from the variety in the linguistic domain, 
we should notice that cognitivism seems an unpromising approach to the meaning of 
many classes of words other than ordinary nouns, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs. Consider 
logical connectives (‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if ’, ‘not’), modal and sentential operators (‘must’, ‘might’, 
‘perhaps’), interjections (‘hurray!’, ‘ouch!’) and performatives (‘hello’, ‘please’); what in the 
world could they be picking out? Rather than denying that these words express any con-
cepts at all, we might expand our understanding of concepts to include other kinds of 
contribution to thought. So perhaps the essential role of normative concepts also is some-
thing other than—or on a hybrid approach, isn’t exhausted by—such (so-called) cogni-
tive functions, as many philosophers have proposed since the 1930s. (However, some 
early noncognitivist accounts, like A. J. Ayer’s emotivist theory that ‘wrong’ is a device 
for conveying disapproval and/or influencing others, seem best characterized as claiming 
there are no normative thoughts or concepts, only normative language.)
Noncognitivism is a radical repudiation of the Classical Theory, because it entails rejec-
tion also of most of the other tenets we observed, which presuppose cognitivism. Against 
the tenet of definitionism, it denies the possibility of capturing the meaning of normative 
terms by a synonymous or intersubstitutable description providing a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. Simply put, the (cognitive) conceptual role of a description is fun-
damentally different than the (noncognitive) conceptual role of a normative term. This 
would explain the truth of OQ3, the lack of correct descriptive definitions of normative 
concepts, in a way that doesn’t license Moore’s conceptual conclusion (OQ4) that norma-
tive concepts are simple and unanalyzable. This is because noncognitivists also reject the 
tenets of compositionality and reductivism, endorsing a broader, nonclassical account of 
what it is to analyze a normative concept. On this account, we analyze a normative con-
cept indirectly (from “sideways on”) by describing what someone is doing or like when 
they possess or use it. Noncognitivism is also well placed to explain how substantive and 
nonanalytic normative thoughts can have an apparently a priori character, and the intui-
tionistic epistemology of ethics. Whatever they might be, normative thoughts are not 
about the obtaining of some (metaphysically objective, mind-independent) state of affairs.
What might conceptual analysis of this kind reveal the noncognitive roles of  normative 
concepts to be? Here, there are many options, but existing views largely fall into two 
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classes. Expressivist theories analyze normative thought in terms of “noncognitive,” 
motivational attitudes like desires, intentions, and emotions, as opposed to the “cog-
nitive” attitude of (ordinary) belief (e.g. Blackburn, 1998; Gibbard, 2003; see Elisabeth 
Camp’s chapter “Metaethical Expressivism”). Inferentialist theories analyze normative 
thought in terms of inferences to and from other attitudes that it either psychologically 
or rationally requires (e.g. Wedgwood, 2007; Chrisman, 2015; see Matthew Chrisman’s 
chapter “Conceptual Role Accounts of Meaning in Metaethics”). For example, an infer-
entialist analysis of ought might claim that to use the concept is to rationally commit 
oneself to certain patterns of intention. (Note that such a theory may reject the possibil-
ity of broadly reductive analysis in nonnormative terms, since rational seems itself a 
normative concept.)
Noncognitivist views are a popular choice from the smorgasbord of metaethical theo-
ries, partly because they emphasize practical aspects of normative thought (e.g. in elicit-
ing action, intention, or emotion) that cognitivist views have struggled to accommodate. 
However, noncognitivists face some difficult challenges. This includes (1) a prima facie 
problem accounting for recalcitrant characters like amoralists, who allegedly have moral 
thoughts without manifesting the motivational attitudes or inferential dispositions that 
noncognitivists claim to be constitutive of such thoughts, and (2) the avowals of many 
people that their normative thoughts are cognitivist, representing metaphysically robust 
normative states of affairs (“moral facts”). These claims are potentially embarrassing for 
noncognitivists given the classical tenet of transparency—one element of the Classical 
Theory they generally don’t reject, since it undergirds their appropriation of (the first step 
of) the OQA. However, we wish to focus on a different issue.
Notoriously, noncognitivist views are faced with an “embedding” (or “Frege-Geach”) 
problem about compositionality (see Jack Woods’ chapter “The Frege-Geach Problem”). 
For illustration, consider the simple and naive form of expressivism that analyzes wrong 
directly in terms of disapproving of something. This may yield a plausible analysis of 
thinking that lying is wrong as disapproving of lying, but it seems unable to account 
for the more complex thought that lying is not wrong, which apparently doesn’t involve 
disapproving of anything. Similarly, the complex thoughts that if lying is wrong then 
deceiving is wrong, and that S believes that lying is wrong, are presumably uses of the 
concept wrong, but they also apparently don’t involve disapproving of anything. While 
debate often focuses exclusively on these kinds of logically complex thoughts (or sen-
tences), at its most general the embedding problem concerns noncognitivism’s ability 
to provide an analysis of a concept or word’s meaning that accounts for the full range of 
different ways the concept or word can be used or deployed. This includes, for example, 
explaining what it is to wonder whether lying is wrong or to suppose or hope that lying is 
wrong, none of which apparently involve disapproving of anything. More sophisticated 
(and recent) noncognitivist theories are designed with the aim of solving the embed-
ding problem, at least with respect to logically complex thoughts—but despite decades 
of debate there is little consensus over whether it can be solved or even what a solution 
must accomplish, and noncognitivists have barely attempted to address it for wondering 
and other non-belief-like thoughts. Here we focus on two aspects of the problem that 
have largely been overlooked but that emerge from thinking particularly about norma-
tive concepts rather than sentences or thoughts.
First, despite apparently disowning simple views of what it is to deploy a normative 
concept, noncognitivists still sometimes endorse a correspondingly simple view of the 
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 normative concept possession: that to possess a concept like wrong is just to be capable 
of having the associated attitude, like disapproval or blame (e.g. Schroeder, 2008). Given 
the range of permissible uses of wrong, this view makes concept possession come apart 
from concept deployment in an awkward way. It isn’t obviously incoherent to imagine a 
person thinking that lying is not wrong, despite her being psychologically incapable of 
disapproval or blame. According to the suggested view, however, she would apparently be 
using a concept that she doesn’t possess! Noncognitivists must either challenge the pos-
sibility as characterized or provide a different account of concept possession.
Second, while noncognitivists have focused on solving the embedding problem at 
the sentential level, or the level of embeddable normative thoughts such as that lying is 
wrong, even if these efforts succeed it can be questioned whether noncognitivism offers a 
viable alternative to the Classical Theory at the level of individual normative concepts like 
wrong. To illustrate this, consider an expressivist theory designed expressly to address 
the embedding problem, biforcated attitude semantics or BAS (Schroeder, 2008). This 
attempts to solve the problem by splitting the attitudinal component of normative thought 
into two parts, identifying the attitude of belief as a generic pro-attitude of “being for” 
taken towards other mental states. BAS analyzes the belief that lying is wrong as the state 
of mind of being for blaming for lying. By splitting the attitudinal component, BAS cre-
ates space for logical operators like not and if in the thought’s content. For example, the 
belief that lying is not wrong is analyzed as being for not blaming for lying. Unlike simple 
expressivist theories, then, BAS can apparently identify a common contribution ‘wrong’ 
makes to the states of mind expressed by the sentences ‘Lying is wrong’ and ‘Lying is not 
wrong’: in each case, it contributes the concept blaming for.
Notice, however, that the attitude-type of blaming for is not itself involved in think-
ing that lying is not wrong (nor, indeed, in thinking that lying is wrong!). Rather, the 
thought is analyzed as an attitude towards/about the state of mind, not blaming for lying. 
BAS thus assigns the concept wrong a traditionally “cognitive” role (of picking out a 
particular type of psychological attitude), the same kind of role as (on a classically cogni-
tivist theory) the concept lying. The noncognitive character of the thought expressed by 
asserting ‘Lying is wrong’ is contributed by the noncognitivist treatment of belief itself. 
(BAS recovers a distinction between cognitive and noncognitive thoughts by offering a 
radically nonclassical analysis of the former.) Schroeder (2008) claims, controversially, 
that the embedding problem can only be solved by a noncognitivist theory with this 
split-attitude structure. If this is correct, noncognitivism may fail to provide a viable 
distinctive approach to normative concepts like wrong, which must make a classically 
cognitive contribution to normative thoughts to support the full range of ways we use 
them. To be clear, this is not an objection to noncognitivism at the level of whole norma-
tive thoughts, but we suggest it is an unappreciated obstacle to conceiving of noncogni-
tivism as a distinct option at the lexical level of individual normative concepts, as it is 
being considered here.
definiTions, PRoToTyPes, and neTwoRks
This section presents two different approaches to normative concepts and their  analysis—
Prototype Theory and Network Theory—that depart from the Classical Theory in 
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a less radical way, accepting the central tenet of cognitivism but rejecting the tenet of 
 definitionism, at least as classically understood. 
Prototype Theory is a broad family of views tracing their lineage back at least to Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblance. Concepts are understood in terms of a 
prototype or exemplar that a subject has in mind, which applies to things depending on 
the degree to which they approximate the prototype as sufficiently like THAT. For a (clas-
sic) example, one’s mental prototype for game might be soccer, in which case a central 
application could be to rugby (conventional rules, a team sport, involves a ball, competi-
tive, involves scoring points, played on a field) and less centrally to chess (conventional 
rules, competitive, but doesn’t involve teams, balls, a field, or scoring points). This rejects 
definitionism’s reliance on necessary and sufficient conditions as the criteria of concept-
application. Perhaps no single feature is necessary for something to fall under a concept 
like game: games needn’t have conventional rules, for instance, or be competitive. Other 
classical tenets that presuppose definitionism are collateral damage. Contra composi-
tionality, concepts are not constructed out of simpler parts, and so, contra reductivism, 
they are not analyzed by decomposition. Conceptual analysis instead takes the form of 
identifying the prototype or listing and weighting the features relevant to falling under 
the concept. There might be no analytic truths involving the concept (other than, per-
haps, applications to the prototype itself), since the concept can in principle apply in the 
absence of any paradigmatic feature provided enough others are present. This supplies a 
potential explanation for OQ2, the lack of closed questions connecting basic normative 
properties with nonnormative features (Goldman, 1993). Competency isn’t grasping a 
descriptive definition but the ability to represent and compare the prototype.
Although Prototype Theory is an important and influential competitor to the Classical 
Theory in the general theory of concepts, in metaethics it lies outside the mainstream. 
(Proponents include Stich, 1993; Wong, 2006; Park, 2013.) To hazard an explanation, 
while it seems easy to imagine exemplars for a central normative concept like wrong, 
philosophers remain unable to agree on the relevant features of even paradigmatically 
wrong actions, like inflicting suffering for fun. Prototype Theory seems more plausible 
and popular for so-called thick normative concepts like cruel—but the thicker the con-
cept, the more controversial its classification as “normative” becomes. (For discussion of 
the strengths and weaknesses of Prototype Theory in general, see Margolis & Laurence, 
1999: 27–43.)
By contrast, Network Theory, as championed particularly by Frank Jackson (1998; 
see also Jackson & Pettit, 1995), has made significant noise in metaethics. This approach 
is often characterized as a return to traditional conceptual analysis, and indeed Jackson 
is occasionally represented, erroneously, as virtually a lone voice defending conceptual 
analysis in the metaethical wilderness. However, Network Theory seems well classified as 
an application of what is known in the general theory of concepts as the Theory Theory 
(for an overview, see Margolis & Laurence, 1999: 43–51) and thereby is better understood 
as a modest departure from the Classical Theory.
Network Theory treats normative concepts or terms on the model of the theoretical 
terms of a scientific theory, with meanings or definitions determined not individually 
but rather holistically by their role or position in the overall theory, or network. It can 
be roughly but usefully understood as the result of applying Classical Theory directly to 
the total network rather than to individual normative concepts. In Jackson’s hands, the 
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relevant network is that of fully matured folk moral theory and consists in three kinds of 
connections, which have the status of constitutive but revisable “platitudes”: (1) internal 
connections between different normative concepts (e.g. that wrong applies to an action 
just in case conclusive reason against applies to it), (2) “input” platitudes connecting 
observable states of affairs with normative concepts (e.g. if an action involves inflicting 
suffering for fun, then it falls under wrong), and (3) “output” platitudes connecting nor-
mative concepts with various responsive behaviors (e.g. aversion in response to applica-
tions of wrong) (1998).
The departures from the Classical Theory are significant. Network Theory may not 
even recognize the existence of concepts at the lexical or individual level, the concep-
tual unit instead being the network. Although Jackson seems to invoke individual con-
cepts, like wrong, he explains that this is just a way of speaking about words (1998: 33). 
The conceptual and referential role of words like ‘wrong’ is determined by their rela-
tions to other parts of the theory, as revealed by the various platitudes. Contra (classical) 
definitionism, it is the theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions—for the 
application of the entire network. Against the tenets of compositionality and reductiv-
ism, conceptual analysis proceeds not by decomposing complex individual concepts into 
simpler parts but by assembling the relevant platitudes (by pumping intuitions from the 
armchair) into a map of the network, taking the form of an extremely complex descrip-
tion. While Jackson understands conceptual analysis as an exercise in global reduction, 
translating a description of reality in one (e.g. normative) vocabulary into a discontinu-
ous (e.g. scientific) vocabulary, the actual reductive work is assigned to a separate, empir-
ical inquiry into which overall constellation of entities, properties, and relations at the 
metaphysical level contingently manifests (close enough to) the same relations. So contra 
the tenet of essentialism, the essential or reductive definitions of normative properties 
are synthetic rather than analytic. This provides one part of Jackson’s strategy for accom-
modating OQ2, the lack of analytic connections between normative and nonnormative 
terms; additionally, the platitudes themselves are not fully analytic or guaranteed true, 
since each individually is potentially defeasible under the pressure towards the mature 
or ideal folk theory.
A general difficulty confronting Network Theory is a Permutation Problem: there is 
no clear guarantee that the complex description of the network will correspond uniquely 
to one complex of properties, in which case the theory underdetermines references for 
normative terms (Smith, 1994). We suggest additionally that these departures from the 
Classical Theory intuitively put the cart before the horse. Whereas Network Theory sug-
gests that we are able to recognize wrongness only derivatively, through our knowledge of 
platitudes such as that inflicting suffering for fun is wrong, it seems more natural to sup-
pose instead that we know the truth of such “platitudes” because we are able immediately 
to recognize wrongness (when we see it) much of the time.
challenging The PReMises of oqa: nonTRansPaRency and 
eMPiRical linguisTics
We have examined a number of ways in which ambitious conceptual analysis has been 
defended against the OQA by rejecting one or another core tenet of the Classical Theory 
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as applied to normative concepts. In this section, we consider whether these responses 
might be overreactions, because we should instead reject the initial premises of Moore’s 
argument. Consider first OQ2: is it really impossible to provide reductive definitions of 
basic normative words or concepts that yield “closed questions”? A very few philosophers 
have been bold enough to reject the premise as demonstrably false: for example, Paul 
Ziff (1960) proposes a reductive analysis of ‘good’ as meaning answers to the interests in 
question. No such proposal has won widespread acknowledgment, but the premise can 
be resisted without being refuted. How such a bold premise can be justifiably accepted is 
unclear when it is impossible to consider every possible definition of ‘good’. Perhaps the 
correct analysis has simply yet to be considered; then what we need is redoubled effort at 
classical conceptual analysis rather than its abandonment.
A modest approach seeks to support OQ2 by induction: we’ve tried enough potential 
conceptual analyses of ‘good’ without yielding closed questions that we can safely infer 
that anything we could try will similarly fail. This seems an exceptionally weak induc-
tion, however, moving from a small sample to a conclusion about all possible definitions. 
Another approach proposes an abductive justification: unanalyzability is the best expla-
nation for why efforts at conceptual analysis of ‘good’ have been unsuccessful so far (e.g. 
Ridge, 2014). But this has yet to be demonstrated; perhaps good is just very complex, 
for example. 
The most ambitious defense of OQ2 involves a particularly strong interpretation of 
the classical tenet of transparency. Perhaps our normative concepts are so transparent 
that we can immediately recognize not only that a proposed definition is correct when 
it is but also what the correct definition or composition of a concept is. Therefore, we 
can directly perceive, in a “flash of light” (Wittgenstein, 1997) or a “just-too-different 
intuition” (Enoch, 2011), that our normative concepts are unanalyzable in nonnormative 
terms. However, even among primitivists, there is widespread disagreement over which 
normative concepts are basic and over the correct (nonreductive or normative) defini-
tions of others. This stance therefore requires a difficult balancing act, finding sufficient 
transparency to license the just-too-different intuitions but not so much as to predict that 
definitional connections between normative concepts would be obvious.
These interpretative issues about the tenet of transparency also point towards an impor-
tant challenge to premise OQ1, that correct analyses always produce closed  questions 
(having self-evident positive answers). Ambitiously reductive conceptual analysis can be 
defended against the OQA by either abandoning or weakening the classical tenets of trans-
parency and competency as grasping a definition. This is a minimal departure from the 
Classical Theory, because it is compatible with retaining all the core (non- epistemological) 
tenets concerning the nature of normative concepts and conceptual analysis: cognitivism, 
definitionism, compositionality, reductivism, analyticity, and essentialism.
Just how transparent must our own concepts be to us? At one extreme is a view we’ll 
call strong transparency (or strong aprioricity): that nobody could fail to know the analy-
sis of their own concept upon reflection. This may follow if “grasping” a concept is sim-
ply mentally tokening its descriptive definition. However, the psychological link between 
concept and definition may be interpreted in subtler ways. At the other extreme is the 
view that our own concepts are entirely opaque to us. Perhaps our minds are so com-
partmentalized that the resources employed in first-order thought about the world are 
impenetrable to conscious introspection. In this case, a normative proposition could 
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be analytically true without being a priori in even the most attenuated sense. Between 
these extremes lie many possibilities we can collectively call weak transparency (or weak 
aprioricity). Perhaps possessing a concept merely entails a disposition to recognize the 
correct definition when presented with it? Or perhaps, more weakly still, possessing a 
concept merely entails that it is possible (although perhaps extremely difficult, requir-
ing advanced philosophical skills and extensive focus) to identify correct definitions and 
analytic truths.
For the widely accepted first step of the OQA to be both sound and compelling, a fairly 
strong form of transparency is required. But strong forms of transparency lead to the so-
called Paradox of Analysis, as follows: if a conceptual analysis is correct then it must be 
uninformative because already known, and if it is informative because not already known 
then it must be incorrect. Since some conceptual analyses are plausibly both informa-
tive and correct, there seem to be some unobvious analyticities (see King, 1998). David 
Lewis (1989) exploits this point to defend a variant of the very analysis Moore originally 
attacked, that good is the concept what we desire to desire.
If we reject the tenet of transparency altogether, by what method can conceptual anal-
ysis be conducted? Or if we accept only a weak version of transparency, how can we 
adjudicate between competing analyses or claims to conceptual expertise? One answer 
is provided by the approach of contemporary linguistic semantics, in the tradition of 
Ordinary Language philosophy. Although not typically characterized as analysis of “con-
cepts,” this employs methods that, although neutral with regard to the theories we’ve 
surveyed, are at least compatible with a minimal departure from the Classical Theory. 
Assuming the word-concept nexus, lexical concepts are ripe for investigation by abduc-
tive and scientific methods. Different hypotheses about the conceptual meanings of nor-
mative words yield differing, testable predictions about competent speakers’ dispositions 
to use them and assent to their use. The primary data here include speakers’ intuitions 
about the acceptability of individual sentences incorporating these words, but this can 
be supplemented with usage, etymological, and cross-linguistic data. Speakers’ intuitions 
can be gathered by fieldwork (such as the surveys favored by experimental philosophy), 
but the most common methodology is for the researcher to mine her own linguistic intu-
itions as a competent speaker herself.
The appeal here to intuitions might be thought at odds with our characterization of 
this method as empirical rather than a priori. But although practiced from the armchair, 
it is a process of abductive reasoning from observed phenomena (our introspected “gut 
reactions” to individual uses of a word) to underlying and hidden causes (our implicit 
concepts). This approach to normative language has made great progress in linguistics 
since the 1970s—especially in the work of Angelika Kratzer (1981) on the meaning of 
modal verbs like ‘ought’ and ‘must’, which was largely overlooked by metaethicists until 
very recently. However, similarly abductive linguistic methods have also been effectively 
practiced in metaethics for decades, as in the analysis of good as a predicate modifier 
on the basis of identifying ‘good’ as an attributive adjective (e.g. Geach, 1956; Foot, 2001; 
Thomson, 2008).
One distinctive break from more traditional conceptions of conceptual analysis is that 
because this method is self-consciously linguistic, it seeks to identify the full range of 
different sentential and conversational contexts in which a particular word like ‘ought’ 
or ‘good’ is used rather than looking narrowly at the distinctly moral or (slightly less 
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 narrowly) normative uses of particular metaethical interest. For example, a sentence like 
‘Ben ought to be at work’ allows two very different kinds of readings, one normative and 
the other epistemic or predictive. Ignoring the latter might seem appropriate given the 
metaethicist’s interest in normative concepts, but if the same lexical concept ought occurs 
in each reading then this is to ignore potentially important clues to its meaning. One 
might think that since the two readings involve different thoughts, the word ‘ought’ must 
be ambiguous between at least two concepts, oughtnormative and  oughtepistemic. But not 
every element of our thoughts is explicitly represented in the grammar of the sentences 
that express them. Linguists and philosophers have successfully developed unifying con-
textualist theories of meaning for words like ‘ought’ by identifying other, usually implicit 
elements that vary between different uses of the same sentence (see Alex Silk’s chapter 
“Metaethical Contextualism”). The differences between the concepts oughtnormative and 
oughtepistemic are then located not in the (unified) lexical concept ought but in contextu-
ally supplied parameters that aren’t explicit in the sentence. This contextualist approach 
also offers a further response to the OQA (e.g. Prior, 1964; Foot, 2001; Thomson, 2008). 
Perhaps the reason why any proposed reductive definition of a normative term fails to 
generate closed questions is that for every definition that correctly analyzes one way of 
supplementing the lexical concept, there are indefinitely many other ways of supplement-
ing that concept to reach a complete thought or predicate; for example, even if ‘good’ isn’t 
lexically ambiguous, ‘Is it good?’ may be a radically ambiguous question.
This neo-classical approach to conceptual analysis faces important challenges, but its 
proponents are not without replies. One challenge is that because words can be lexically 
ambiguous—like ‘bank’, which expresses at least the concepts bankriver and  bankfinancial—a 
linguistic methodology faces the risk of wild goose chases after nonexistent unifying con-
cepts. However, we believe that the track record of this approach warrants considerable 
optimism (for a sustained case, see Finlay, 2014). Another challenge is the possibility 
that different people use the same words with different concepts—a threat to take seri-
ously given divergences in people’s moral intuitions. However, moral disputes seem pre-
theoretically like substantive disagreements rather than cases of talking past one another, 
suggesting common concepts with disputed application. (For discussion of the problem 
of normative concept identity and a novel solution, see Schroeter & Schroeter, 2014.) A 
related complaint is that it is objectionably parochial to focus on English words like ‘good’ 
and ‘ought’ or to assume that speakers of other languages employ the same concepts in 
their normative thought. However, plausibly at least “thin” normative concepts like those 
expressed by ‘good’, ‘wrong’, and ‘ought’ are practically universal in human thought, since 
interpreters seldom hesitate to offer these words as translations of central words in other 
languages. Additionally, if a society were to conduct its normative thought with different 
concepts it is unclear what bearing this would have on our metaethical questions, which 
presumably are couched in our own concepts. Rather, such a discovery would just bring 
to light new questions we hadn’t previously entertained.
Finally, it is complained that the normative concepts most relevant for philosophy 
aren’t necessarily those that happen to be lexicalized in natural language. A rival model 
of philosophical inquiry enjoins abandoning conceptual analysis in favor of “reform-
ing definition” (Brandt, 1979), addressed to the question of what concepts we ought to 
use our words to express. But determining which concepts we ought to use plausibly 
requires an understanding of the concepts we’re already using (Plunkett, 2016), which 
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is what neo-classical conceptual analysis seeks to provide. Since metaethicists’ interests 
are plausibly continuous with those of the “folk,” and metaethical questions plausibly 
arise out of reflection on ordinary normative thought and speech, it is also far from clear 
that the concepts of metaethical significance aren’t just those expressed by our everyday 
normative vocabulary.
In conclusion, although conceptual analysis remains a controversial approach to meta-
ethics, we suggest there are many more conceptions or varieties of it than is commonly 
recognized, each of which supports an active research program with devoted champions.
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